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Abstract 
 
 The 17 "rare earth elements" are essential for the development of new 
technologies.  Over the last several decades, China has established a virtual monopoly on 
the rare earth industry, producing over 97% of the world's current demand. This was 
achieved by effectively undercutting other producers who stopped competing in this 
market.  In 2010, in an effort to bolster its domestic market, China decided to reduce the 
amount of rare earth elements that it would export.  This situation can be used to consider 
China's relations with the rest of the world from two perspectives.  (1) The realist 
perspective views China's actions as threatening to both the US hegemony and our 
system of international institutions.  (2) Alternatively, the liberal view interprets the 
Chinese activities as defensive, protectionist and benign.  The liberal view has more 
evidence to support it, considering economic, political and social constraints that prevent 
the Chinese leadership from taking total control of the international marketplace for the 
rare earth elements.  To continue its long-term development and economic growth, a 
rational China will choose not to act in a way that would cause other countries to mistrust 
China.  
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“Rare earths are the economic and technologic foundation of a safe and secure 
Nation. To possess them imparts independence, immunity to coercion, and the 
tools to invoke scientific advancement.” -- James B. Hedrick 
 
Introduction 
  
On the periodic table, approximately 17 elements are classified as rare earth elements 
(REEs), or rare earth metals.  These 17 elements, and a few additional elements that have 
been added to this group of minerals, have become extremely important to the 
technologic and economic development of many countries.  REEs are used in many of 
the new technologies being developed around the world.  The value of these metals 
derives from their application in new green technology such as hybrid cars or wind 
turbines, military weapons such as precision guided missiles and radar equipment, and 
even our iPhones and new flat screen televisions.   
  
However, over the last 20 years the mining and production of these important resources 
have transferred from a global network to a single producer: China.  China currently 
produces over 97% of all rare earths used throughout the world.  Its domination of the 
market was gained through cheap labor practices and lax environmental standards that 
allowed China to push competitors out of business.  In 2010, the power of this control 
became painfully apparent.  Following a territorial dispute between China and Japan, 
China completely suspended Japan’s supply of REEs for one month.  Realizing the 
market control exerted by this action, China subsequently decided to limit the amount of 
REEs for global exportation.  Limiting the export of REEs may have started as a way to 
punish Japan for the territorial dispute, but it now evolved into an issue of domestic 
growth potential for China.  This maneuvering does not bode well for industries outside 
of China that rely on these resources for their operations.  
  
Since this incident, the US, Japan and the EU have attempted to negotiate with China.  
Countering with new mines in other areas around the world could take as long as 10 years 
to become established.  Until then, China can maintain a virtual monopoly on these vital 
elements and thus can hold a very controlling position and unfair marketing advantage 
over the rest of the world.  In March 2012, the US, Japan and the EU appealed to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) for assistance, claiming unfair trade practices.  China 
has defended its case and to date has not changed any of its policies.   
  
My paper will examine this issue from two perspectives.  The first will be from a realist 
perspective, which views this situation as a sign of warning that China is attempting to 
use its power and influence to affect and alter world institutions to better fit its own 
agendas.  This perspective sees China as a threat to our international system, and to the 
US hegemony.  The alternative perspective is the economic liberal or liberal 
institutionalist perspective.  This perspective contends that this action is not an attempt to 
alter our international institutions, but rather is a struggle to work within the system to 
allow China to continue its economic growth and development.  I will argue my final 
thoughts from the liberal institutionalist perspective.  I will provide evidence that, based 
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on the premise that China is acting rationally, China is faced with both political and 
economic constraints that to act in a threatening manner towards our current institutions 
and systems would be detrimental to its future.  Given China’s use of our current 
institutions, any attempt to overthrow or weaken it would result in a slow-down of 
economic growth.  Our international system of economics has evolved to the point where 
the growth rate of any single country cannot be more rapid compared with the other 
countries with which it is connected.  I will provide evidence that would make it very 
unlikely and unwise for China to present itself as a threat to our international norms.   
  
Before I begin to examine these two perspectives, it is important to understand the 
significance and importance of studying REEs when analyzing China’s role in the 
international arena.  China’s actions surrounding the case of REEs have impacted other 
countries on a global scale, contributing to heated debates and calling to question many 
of the US, EU and Japan’s decisions regarding reliability of any potential partnerships 
with China.  This issue has raised many questions and is essential to understanding a 
complete picture of the power and influence China may or may not have.  While China 
may be employing tactics that would be considered unfair according to our international 
standards, we must not forget that China is still in a developing stage and has not acted in 
malicious ways towards institutions like the WTO or the UN Security Council.  China is 
simply trying to do what is best for its people and establish a reasonable living standard 
for its citizens before becoming too involved in international politics. 
  
I will begin my paper with a brief history of China’s involvement in the rare earth sector, 
to help establish a background and basis for the conflict.  Next, I will discuss the realist 
perspective, examining how China has amassed a great deal of power that could be used 
against the international institutions, or specifically against the US.  This perspective 
stands to counter my main argument that China should not be considered a threat to our 
international norms and the US hegemony.  I will then consider the economic 
liberal/liberal institutionalist perspective, which looks at the other side of the story.  This 
perspective interprets China’s actions as benevolent and does not believe that their policy 
decisions should be an alarm for concern.  This perspective leads me into my final section 
that examines the many constraints that both China and the US (as well as the rest of the 
world) may face that prevent any of those involved from resorting to extreme actions.   
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Brief History of Rare Earth Elements and China 
 
Rare earth elements (REEs) are a group of 17 metallic elements that are found naturally 
within the Earth’s crust.  Unlike their name suggests, these metals are not actually rare, 
nor are they dirt (“earths”).  They are quite abundant and can be found in many countries 
around the world.  For examples, yttrium is more abundant than lead, cerium is more 
abundant than tin, and even the rarer of the rare earths are more abundant than the 
platinum-group elements (Spedding, 2000: 209). REEs acquired their name to distinguish 
them from the alkaline earth elements (e.g., beryllium, calcium, and magnesium) that are 
found in the same deposits as many REEs (Cordier, 2011).  Originally discovered in the 
17th century, REEs were eventually isolated as oxides from the rare metals in the 18th and 
19th centuries (Castor, 2004).  In the 20th century, more complex and efficient processes 
were developed that allowed separation of these minerals into pure and usable forms.  
Application to commercial use only appeared during the last 50 or 60 years (Castor, 
2004).   
 
These elements are special for several reasons.  Due to the unique properties that rare 
earth metals possess, REEs are used in many high tech applications. As an example, the 
phosphorus light emitted from a combination of highly purified yttrium and europium 
produces the red colors in many of our modern televisions and computers (Spedding, 
2000: 212).  Other usages for these metals include magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
scans, fiber optic communication, hybrid cars, wind turbines, lasers, radar systems, glass 
polishers, permanent magnets, petroleum refiners, headphones and many others 
(Humphries, 2011 and Hurst, 2010).  The discovery of these elements has been a boon for 
the high tech industries.   
 
It is for this very reason that China has emphasized the importance of REEs in its growth 
and development.  Countries from around the world had mined rare earths for many 
years.  The world’s second largest mine, Mountain Pass in California, followed by Mount 
Weld in Australia, had produced a majority of the rare earths until the 1990’s when China 
began to heavily invest in REEs and drove most of its competition out of business.  
Through the use of inexpensive labor, heavy government subsidies, and low 
environmental standards, China’s entry into the marketplace made it economically 
unfeasible for other countries to compete in the global market.   
 
Initially when China began producing REEs, the US and Japan were not concerned with 
the source of their REEs, as long as they could obtained cheaply, and even mitigated the 
environmental costs to China who was happy enough to carry the burden.  China flooded 
the international market with its cheap metals.  In a span of ten years, starting in 1990, 
“China’s production increased over 450% to 73,000 metric tons (t) from about 16,000 t 
(Tse, 2011).”   
 
However once China understood the importance of these elements in determining its 
future, China began to change its policies.  China discovered the possibilities that rare 
earths could play in the future of technology in the 1980’s, dedicating resources to 
developing new programs to both the mining and the study of these elements.  In 1986, 
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China began a new project devoted to technology ranging from biotech to space research.  
This project was called “863 Program” (Osnos, 2009).  China began investing billions of 
dollars into researching rare earths.  Its hope was to gain a stronger foothold in the 
international arena and to use new technology to effectively catch up with the rest of the 
developed world.  Given its abundant stockpiles and access to REE, China realized that 
these minerals could be the key to its growth and development.  
 
China’s control of the rare earth sector seemed to function perfectly for the rest of the 
world.  A constant stream of cheap metals was readily available from China.  However, 
China’s initial goal in investing in this industry was to help promote the development of 
its country into a more developed country.  The Chinese wished to “[move] from a model 
of ‘made in China’ to one of ‘innovated in China’ (Segal, 2010).”  This meant that China 
would need to move away from functioning as a “supplier-nation” and instead become a 
“buyer-consumer nation” of REE (Wray, 2011).  China understood that the real money 
and rewards lay not in the supplying of raw materials, but rather in the application of 
these materials into useful products.  At this point in time, in 2000, however, China was 
only consuming about 19,000t of REEs (Tse, 2011: 5).  China realized that its production 
of rare metals might be insufficient to sustain the planned and anticipated economic 
growth and development.  Therefore, one of two things could be done.  Either China 
would be forced to produce much greater quantities of rare earth to meet both 
international and national demand, or it could slowly reduce the amount of REEs 
exported to allow local producers ample access as it developed domestic markets.  From 
its baseline of about 19,000t of REEs in 2000, by 2009 China had increased its 
consumption to nearly “73,000 t, about 380 percent higher than in 2000 (Tse, 2011: 5).”  
After several years of increasing local use, China realized that to continue to increase its 
own consumption, it could not sustain both the domestic and international markets.  
Therefore, China decided that it was in its best interest to begin cutting exports to 
consumers of REEs around the world, mainly Japan, the US and the EU.  Over the course 
of the last five years, China has slowly decreased the amount of rare earth allowed for 
export.  However, only in the last several years has China reduced exports below global 
demand.  To validate their monopolistic policies, it needed an event or spark that came in 
the form of a territorial dispute with Japan in 2010.  
 
On September 7th, 2010, a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship in 
contested territory between the two countries.  This event led to a serious diplomatic 
conflict between China and Japan over who controlled the territory and its economic 
benefits.  Among other actions, China responded immediately by cutting off Japan from 
rare earth metals.  Japan, to show its willingness to be diplomatic and righteous in its 
reactions, was left with no choice but to release the Chinese fisherman.  However, 
tensions between the two countries remained high.  The Chinese claimed that its 
sovereignty had been threatened and felt the need to take a tough stance on the issue 
(Park, 2010).  Little did the Chinese fisherman know that his actions would be the 
catalyst for a chain of events that would forever change the future of the rare earth market 
and political tensions between China and the rest of the world.   
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Cutting off Japan from rare earth metals was just the beginning.  China recognized its 
need for greater quantities of rare earths and saw this as a window of opportunity to begin 
pulling back from its role as the global producer. China then announced its new policy 
that would limit the amount of REEs allowed for exportation.  This had several effects.  
First, the prices of rare earths rapidly escalated.  Over the next year, prices increased by 
as much as 1000% (Wray, 2011).  Elements such as neodymium went from $45 to near 
$450 per ton (Wray, 2011).  While this may be considered counterintuitive to China’s 
goals, China’s support of the rare earth sector in the form of both subsidies and research 
grants allowed this market to continue business as usual.  Additionally, one of the main 
sources of price spikes came from implementation of Chinese export tariffs, making it 
more difficult for international compared with domestic consumers to purchase the REEs.  
Second, countries and companies that relied on China’s supply of REEs realized that they 
had a dilemma. They had two options: move production to China, or find alternative 
sources for REEs.  Both presented equally disturbing choices.  Reestablishing old mines 
could take many years, with some industry experts noting that it could be up to ten years 
before older mines would be able to compensate for the loss of Chinese exports 
(Kefferpütz, 2010).  Not only are permits and regulatory standards necessary, but also the 
initial investment requirements are huge, often in the hundreds of millions of dollars.  
The urgency of the situation has also forced several companies in developing countries to 
begin the production of REEs without adhering to all of the safety standards.  One of the 
largest mines in the world, located in Kuantan, Malaysia, has “risen out of the red mud” 
and begun production, much to the dismay of the local population that is worried about 
radiation, regulatory challenges, and refinery safety (Bradsher, 2012b).  Alternatives are 
available, such as recycling.  Additionally, countries such as the US and the EU do have 
stockpiles in reserve, but this would only be a temporary solution.  Business as usual 
cannot be stopped to wait for alternatives, which has forced many companies to “[move] 
to China from all over the world to be closer to their sources of supply” (Rare earths – 
Nytimes.com, 2012).  “Showa Denko,” a producer of hybrid car magnets, “announced 
that in June it will increase by 50% its output in China of alloys used in magnets for 
hybrids (Chang, 2011).”  Other companies are following this tact.  Hitachi metals, a 
Japanese company, is considering making the move to assure continued access to this 
precious commodity (Chang, 2011).  Gordan Chang, a commentator for Forbes 
magazine, sees this as a slightly more serious problem.  He believes:   
“This is a pattern we have seen before, in industry after industry.  As analyst John Tkacik notes, China’s 
predatory policies follow a predictable pattern: Beijing demands that foreigners bring technology to China 
and then the Chinese steal the technology, undercut foreign competition on global markets with subsidies, 
and finally drive foreign competitors into bankruptcy. 
The world’s free-trade architecture is not working as it should.  China’s rapacious rare-earth tactics 
demonstrate that governments need to intervene, perhaps with measures as rough as Beijing’s (Chang, 
2011)” 
 
While this all seems unfair and quite threatening to the rest of the world, China believes 
that it has done nothing wrong and sees no issue with the latest activities.  China “has 
repeatedly explained to other governments already that its raw materials export policy 
‘aims to protect resources and the environment,’ not distort industry (Miller, 2012).”  Its 
intent from the very beginning has been to promote domestic growth and development 
and to curb the environmental impact on the mining of rare earth.  The tax that China 
began imposing on the export of REEs was reported by China’s Xinhua News Agency to 
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be used “to support research on rare-earth processing and application technology, set up 
environmental compensation funds or build rare-earth reserves (Wray, 2011).”  China 
began this endeavor by closing down several mines in an attempt to reorganize and 
reconstruct the processes employed for extraction.  This could allow further reinvestment 
into new and cleaner technology.  As the extraction process both produces toxic waste 
and causes other types of environmental damage, this claim does have some validity.  
Additionally, Liu Weimin, a spokesman for China on this issue, supported China’s recent 
decision to limit exports.  The Chinese leadership believes that these actions comply with 
WTO rules and are within the limits of what is acceptable activity.  While countries like 
the US, Japan and Mexico have filed complaints to the WTO about the Chinese export 
restrictions, the WTO rules allow countries to enact policies that would limit “production 
and consumption, [which] could help correct market failures that lead to environmental 
degradation and unsustainable resource depletion (Karapinar, 2011: 392).”  The WTO 
article XX reads as follows: 
“WTO members may adopt policy measures that are inconsistent with GATT disciplines, but necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health (paragraph (b)), or relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources (paragraph (g)) (WTO, 2012).” 
Therefore, the Chinese argue that its export restriction policies fall into the “conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources” category, and exclude them from adhering to the GATT 
disciplines.  The Chinese are well aware of the impact of its mining activities and believe 
that these export restrictions will help to mitigate the environmental degradation.  Liu 
thought the accusations against China were completely unjustified and unfair (Wan, 
2012).  
 
However, when China began to set export quotas on their rare earth exports, China had a 
relatively clear idea of what its goals were, with no serious or well-structured plan on 
how to get there.  The problematic and inconsistent policy decisions that China enacted 
since this dispute began implies that China did not have a coherent goal of what it was 
trying to accomplish.  The fact that China’s export quotas have remained below the 
global consumption level suggests that the leaders were trying to allude to their 
intentions, with no real intent to hurt the global market (Yuan, 2012).  Prices have 
recently begun to decline – not quite to the levels of pre-2010, but the prices of eight rare 
earths have dropped 41% in the last 6-12 months (Yuan, 2012).  While China is 
concerned with growth, the country is still reliant on foreign direct investment (FDI) from 
the US, EU, Japan and other countries that supply much of their technological 
innovations to China.  The inconsistency of long-term goals is further complicated by the 
fact that China is in the midst of an election year, so each politician is concerned with 
being portrayed as “soft” towards foreign entities.  While China may have certain 
strategies it wishes to follow, the political atmosphere in this election year may impact its 
current policy decisions.    
 
Despite these considerations, China may be in an optimal position to use its REEs to 
promote the type of domestic growth that would propel the country into the ranks of 
developed countries.  China has set a goal for itself that by 2020, it should “reduce its 
‘degree of dependence on technology from other countries to 30 percent or less’ (down 
from 50 percent today) (Segal, 2010).”  By investing both in the rare earth resources and 
the technology research beyond its applications, China hopes to become a powerhouse in 
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the high tech industry.  In 1992, Deng Xiaoping said that "there is oil in the Middle East, 
there is rare earth in China," referring to the dominance that China could play in the 
future of the world’s technology (Doll, 2007).  China has likely stumbled upon the 
resource of the future, and successfully over the course of the last 20 years has created a 
virtual monopoly on the resource.   
  
For these reasons, in mid March, 2012, the US, Japan and the EU brought a case to the 
WTO against China claiming that China was employing unfair trade practices with their 
export tariffs on REEs.  President Barack Obama spoke out against the unfair trade 
practices that China was using, hoping to encourage negotiation or, at the least, 
discussion of possible solutions to this problem.  “If China would simply let the market 
work on its own, we’d have no objections,” President Obama said on March 13, 2012 
(Wan, 2012).  However, as previously stated, China is ready to defend the accusations 
brought against them.  Xinhua, the official state-run news agency, warned that any 
actions made by the US against China could result in repercussions for the US (Wan, 
2012).  As a developing country with a reputation to uphold, China is very protective of 
its international standing and will not allow the Western powers to halt their activities.   
  
This was not the first case that has brought against China.  In 2009, the EU, the US and 
Mexico filed a similar complaint against China in relation to its policies on export 
restrictions on food products and natural resources.  This led to heated international 
debates on the issue, lasting for several years (Karapinar, 2011).  In January of 2012 the 
WTO finally ruled that “China must dismantle its system of export taxes and quotas for 
nine widely used industrial materials (Bradsher, 2012).”  This success prompted the 
subsequent case regarding rare earth metals against China.   
  
Lastly, as with the case in 2009 that took several years to be decided, the new appeal 
brought forth by the US, EU and Japan in regards to REEs may also take a lengthy time 
to resolve.  If the WTO cannot reach an agreement soon, the window to ensure a fair and 
balanced business environment will potentially close.  Businesses cannot stand to wait for 
agreements to be made, and will most likely decide to find their own alternatives instead 
of waiting for any prolonged period of time.  New mines may already be established, or 
businesses may have already relocated to China.   
 
Overall this is a terrible dilemma for global consumers of REEs.  China has caught the 
world off its guard, and now has the upper hand in this situation.  
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Realist Perspective 
 
First I will consider the perspective of the American realist (not a Chinese realist).  The 
realist perspective is pessimistic about future of Sino-US relations.  This perspective 
views China as a rising superpower in the world, moving from what could be considered 
a developing country into a developed one.  Given this assumption, realists see China as a 
threat to current global order and the US hegemony.  Their beliefs are that China will rise 
to contest our current international institutions, shaping a new world order that would be 
created for the benefit of its own domestic interests.  This perspective views this not only 
as a threat to our established international systems, but also that China’s intentions are 
inconsistent with current global procedure and should be interpreted as threatening.   
 
Realists view China not as actively threatening international institutions and norms (to fit 
its own strategic plans), but rather as a growing world power with the capability to shake 
its fists should it so desire.  This fear is compounded with the rationale that China already 
has a number of advantages of the rest of the world, and their ability to control and 
monopolize the rare earth industry could simply be interpreted as a prelude of more to 
come.  Realists understand that the US and the rest of the world have had their 
differences with China, and when China decides that it is advantageous to its future to act 
in a fashion different from those of the current norms, it will not see the US as an ally, 
but instead as a threat.  Although this may not be in their immediate plans, realists argue 
that simply the ability to do this leads us to the conclusion that the US, and the rest of the 
world, must act now to counter this threat.  China’s unconventional rise as a country has 
provoked a conflict that realists believe needs to be dealt with. REEs play an important 
role in this process.  Rare earths are seen as an extremely important commodity to the 
future of technology around the world.  REEs are used in many of the most advanced 
technological innovations of the last 20-30 years.  By controlling access to the abundant 
supply of these metals, China can take considerable advantage in new technology over 
the rest of the world.   
 
One of the single most important assumptions to the realist perspective is that China is a 
rising power.  This fact credits many of the ideas and fears realists share about the future 
with China’s role in the international arena.  Since China first began its economic reforms 
in 1978, “the PRC’s [People’s Republic of China’s] gross national product (GNP) is 
thought to have increased by a factor of four and, according to some estimates, it could 
double again by the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century (Friedberg, 
2005).”  With this increase in national productivity and resources, China has easily 
expanded its military, spending increasing amounts on arms and military equipment.  Not 
only has their military grown in strength and numbers, but also their ability to adopt and 
acquire more advanced technology has allowed them to become even more powerful.  
Additionally, China’s diplomacy has expanded outside of Asia, now reaching to Africa, 
Latin America and the Middle East (Ikenberry, 2008).  During The Cold War, when the 
US was competing against the Soviet Union for global hegemony, the US was matched 
by the Soviet Union only as a military rival, whereas China is proving itself to be both 
militarily and economically competitive (Ikenberry, 2008).  However, China is still far 
from being considered a real military rival.  Another realist, John Mearsheimer, believes 
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that as China continues to gain power, “China, like all previous potential hegemons, 
[will] be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon (Friedberg, 2005).”  This shift away 
from the US hegemony and Western institutions has caused skepticism and fear among 
many.   
 
One extreme realist, John Mearsheimer, believes that China represents an imminent 
threat that needs to be addressed immediately. China has the power to become a global 
hegemony that will rival the US, and has the capacity to move in this direction whenever 
it determines that the time is right.  He believes that “it is more likely that [China] will 
want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the 
way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss (Mearsheimer, 
2005).”  Further, he explains how just as the US had done earlier in the 19th century, 
China may move to enact new policies to weaken the surrounding countries like Japan 
and Russia.  It has the power to do this from a number of standpoints, one of which we 
have seen more recently with China’s decision to cut Japan off from rare earths in 2010 
(Park, 2010).   
 
Another author, Sun-Won Park, has recognized that relations between Russia and China 
strengthened over the last several years, while “Chinese relations with the ASEAN 
[Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries and Japan and South Korea—i.e., its 
East Asian neighbors—and relations with the U.S. are not so smooth.”  Realists interpret 
China’s recent policy decisions as a reason to be fearful.  This sort of attitude 
demonstrates that China has the capacity and confidence as a nation to disregard or 
otherwise counteract policies set to ensure smooth international relations. 
 
David Shambaugh, another believer of the realist perspective, views China’s 
unpredictability as a problem for the US and Western institutions.  He believes that the 
many issues surrounding China have led them to become hesitant to fully embrace global 
norms (Shambaugh, 2010).  Chinese diplomacy has varied over the last several decades, 
at one time negotiating trade agreements or allying with countries such as North Korea or 
Iran, while at the same time participating in G-20, WTO and UN Security Council 
agendas.  Shambaugh believes “the reason behind fluctuation in Chinese diplomacy lies 
in the fact that China remains deeply conflicted about its international identity and the 
roles it should play in the world. As one leading Chinese scholar told the recent 
Stockholm China Forum, “China is still wrestling with what kind of world order it wants 
(Shambaugh, 2010).”  Considering that it could be argued that China should be included 
in the group of the most powerful nations in the world, it would seem that its role should 
be much more clearly defined, or at the least, shaped towards current international norms.  
Instead, this inconsistency leads Shambaugh to believe that China’s actions will be aimed 
at “[pursuing] a more narrowly self-interested foreign policy with a few priorities 
(Shambaugh, 2010).”  This agenda is more consistent with China’s decision to begin 
stemming the flow of rare earths outside of their country.  A monopoly on rare earths (a 
plan long in the making, starting with the research and purchasing of mines in the 1980’s) 
provides a secure and profitable future for China.  If China is willing to make these sorts 
of decisions, it cannot be trusted to support other allied nations if it would not be in its 
best interest.   
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China’s new role in the international arena is also changing.  As China gains more 
political and economic power and influence throughout the world, it has been allowed to 
participate in the established world order.  Organizations like the WTO, G-20, the UN 
Security Council, and other international institutions have brought China into their midst, 
giving China new influence in global policy.  However, China is at the disadvantage, 
given that it was “not present at the creation of this world order, so it will have to 
reconcile its differences with other nations and accommodate the order’s rules to 
integrate successfully (Lloyd-Damnjanovic, 2011).”  As a fledging to this world order, 
China is in a position where it may be required to follow rules and policies that are 
inconsistent with their long-term agenda.  China has thus “attempted to use its own power 
and influence to balance American hegemonic power on issues that do not serve Chinese 
interests (Mingjiang, 2011).”  For example, China has put a great amount of effort into 
taking a greater role in the global community.  China is using its power to provide aid of 
other countries, just as the US and other developed countries have done in the past.  
Unfortunately, these actions are not always in sync with the plans of the Western order.  
Realists are concerned that given China’s past policy decisions, this fact places 
international institutions, including the US and its interests, in a dangerous and often 
contentious position of needing to defend and stand against the reshaping of global 
norms. 
 
Several times, China has proved that its actions do not typically follow established 
norms.  China’s ideology has evolved from Marxism to becoming more “focused on the 
preservation and protection of the Communist Party. In China’s eyes, the United States is 
a “crusading liberal power” seeking to convert other nations to its own democratic model 
(Lloyd-Damnjanovic, 2011).”  China’s interpretation of US policy is that it has “been to 
tame China…but also over time to transform China (Lloyd-Damnjanovic).”  This attitude 
has put China on the defensive, possibly in a mindset where Chinese leadership may be 
unconcerned with the dilemmas of the Western world.  Just as China had decided that 
rare earths should be used to benefit China regardless of the consequences to other 
countries (giving no warning, nor any indication of its true intentions or long-term 
strategies), China has begun to create uncertainty and anxiety across Asia, and has 
recently elicited responses from the US from its actions.  Within the last 12 months, 
China has: 
“• Shielded North Korea from tough international sanctions, despite Pyongyang's unprovoked sinking of a 
South Korean naval vessel and deadly shelling of a small island;” 
“• Intensified its long-standing claim to virtually all of the resource-rich South China Sea by suggesting that 
the region was a "core national interest," a term previously used to refer only to areas (like Tibet and 
Taiwan) over which China is willing to go to war. 
• Declared publicly that, when it comes to resolving competing claims over this region ‘China is a big 
country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact.’ 
• Threatened for the first time to impose sanctions on U.S. companies that participate in arms sales to 
Taiwan (Friedberg, 2011).” 
These actions, among others, have led many realists to believe that China is not interested 
in adhering to the established global norms, but may in fact choose to create its own.  
 
Even given all of this evidence, I disagree with the realist perspective.  China has spent 
the last 30-40 years integrating itself into the contemporary global order and has 
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experienced economic growth and development previously unseen.  Its continued 
economic success can be attributed to its cooperation with the WTO and other 
international organizations.  Without the support of other countries, China would be 
unable to continue its current level of growth.  Before China can concern itself with 
international politics, it must still focus on developing and integrating its own markets 
into those of the developed world.  China has plenty of its own problems; I do not believe 
China needs to also adopt those of the rest of the world. 
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Economic Liberal / Liberal Institutionalist Perspective 
 
The second perspective I address is the economic liberal and liberal institutionalist 
perspective.  This perspective regards China as a constantly improving and evolving 
example of how a developing country could assimilate itself into the established 
international system.  This perspective interprets China’s actions not as an attempt to 
rework or modify the current world order, but rather as an attempt to develop as a nation 
from within.  China is currently in a transition period.  As it attempts to establish its role 
in the international arena, it is still experimenting in how it wishes to conduct itself.  This 
phase is thought to be temporary by liberals, who believe that in the long run China will 
adhere to international trade and political norms.  Liberals argue that instead of focusing 
on countering China’s plans, we should instead seek out alternative sources of REEs until 
China decides that it can be trusted as a reliable supplier of such essential materials.   
 
China presents us with a unique case of a rising power because of the resources available 
to its development.  The previously established world order created after WWII provided 
a basis for developing countries to follow.  This system was not meant to force countries 
to be submissive to the system, but rather to allow for a fair and balanced world order for 
the mutual benefit of all. Therefore, China has had the opportunity to rise within a slew of 
“international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is 
doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country’s 
development of global power status (Ikenberry, 2008).”  These advantages would likely 
cause a rational China to continue working within this system.  It would seem ludicrous 
for China to suddenly turn away from this system and attempt to reshape it to form a 
Chinese version.   
 
The Chinese need these international institutions, not only for the security of their 
sovereignty, but also for the continued advancement and growth of their economy.  This 
necessity represents just one of many constraints that China faces.  In our modern times, 
state power is less dictated by military power and instead is based on prolonged economic 
development.  For example, “China is well aware that no major state can modernize 
without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world 
power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Ikenberry, 
2008).”  Institutions like the WTO offer opportunities for growth and development that 
would be impossible to match otherwise.  This reliance on the world order requires strict 
adherence to political and economic norms, that if not followed, would break apart the 
very fabric that holds these institutions together.  China is aware of its dependence on the 
“continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the 
system’s rules and institutions provide (Ikenberry, 2008).”  Just as the US and other 
Western powers use these institutions to protect themselves (sometimes from nations like 
China), China would reap the same benefits.  Given China’s status, Li Minjiang, another 
liberal, argues that China “has been the biggest beneficiary of the existing system over 
the past three decades (Mingjiang, 2011).”  In the long run, China has little incentive to 
try to alter these established norms and institutions.   
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The liberal perspective recognizes that China is still in the process of developing.  
Mingjiang does not see China’s “unfair” trade practices in the rare earth industry as a 
deterrent from this strategy of working within the world order, but rather as a ploy to take 
advantage of the systems to accelerate its development. Situations like this are simply 
examples of how China is “willing to accept and participate in the existing international 
system but at the same time, mostly uses it in a pragmatic fashion to maximize its own 
interests (Mingjiang, 2011: 3).”  While China acknowledges the fact that it must work 
from within this system, its agenda has not changed from prolonged and increasing 
economic growth, at whatever the cost.  A spokesman for China, Liu Weimin, defended 
China’s rare earths export limits. “‘We believe such measures comply with WTO rules,’ 
Liu said.  He described as “groundless” the accusation that China was using its position 
to control a valuable commodity and benefit Chinese firms (Wan, 2012).”  China does 
not believe that its actions are unjustified or out of line.  China has found a way to use the 
current system to gain a competitive edge.  However, it remains unclear whether China’s 
true intentions are for monopolistic purposes to take total control of the market or simply, 
as its leadership asserts, are for the benefit of their domestic market. This has been a 
problem with China in the past, as its official statements are difficult to trust and are 
consistent with its secretive nature.  In any case, China has continued to observe the rules 
and norms set forth by international institutions, although reinterpreting them to best fit 
with their agenda.  
 
Additionally, continued classification as a ‘developing country’ places China in a unique 
position as a supporter and spokesperson for the global-South.  As a country moving 
from the developing into the developed country status, China has seen both sides to how 
our current system functions.  As a rising power, soon to be considered among the league 
of “developed” nations, China has had a unique perspective of this world order and is 
advocating for slight changes.  Jenny Clegg, another well-respected economic liberal, 
believes that China is more of a supporter of our US hegemony and international system 
of institutions than we may give them credit.  She believes that China,  
“whilst holding the obligations of developed countries in international governance to be greater and more 
binding, China recognises that developing countries are not without their own responsibilities.  In this it 
endeavours to lead by example, balancing its level of international cooperation with the limits of its own 
conditions…with its own ambitious plans for the development of clean energy technologies (Clegg, 2011).” 
This perspective suggests that China is fully aware of the norms in place, but is forced to 
work around them given their own responsibilities as a developing nation.  It hopes that 
with cooperation and its success by working within the system, it is able to demonstrate 
to other developing nations how it can be done.  Clegg also believes that more than China 
fully being involved and committed to this system, China has been respectful of the US’s 
hegemony.  China has “openly [acknowledged] US world leadership, accommodating at 
times to maintain US engagement and reduce the risk of a return to unilateralism, whilst 
at the same time careful to protect its own sovereignty (Clegg, 2011: 461).”  This 
provides further evidence that China’s intentions are not in opposition to existing world 
orders, nor against the US hegemony.  In reality, China’s ascendance as another power in 
the world, through no active action of their own, will affect the US hegemony, but only 
due to the conditions set forth by our existing systems.   
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The economic liberal perspective on China’s activities surrounding the rare earth debate 
is in complete contrast and disagreement with realists.  Realists see this event as yet 
another reason to deepen our mistrust in China, while the liberal perceives this event as 
being completely blown out of proportion.  This would not be the first time that concern 
over the supply of a valuable resource (such as rare earth or various metals) could 
suddenly disappear.  During the mid-20th century, tin was considered a critical metal.  
Due to fear that the communism could spread to tin producing countries including 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, the US built a stockpile of tin that in 1972, at its peak, 
contained 250,000 tons of the metal (Blas, 2010).  This was equal to more than the entire 
annual supply of tin for the world at the time.  It took the US over 30 years to then 
dissolve their overabundance of tin once the fear of losing its mines passed (Blas, 2010).  
This example demonstrates that just as was the case with tin, the rare earth crisis may 
simply be exaggerated, but if we overreact may take many years to rectify. 
 
Lastly, the liberal perspective is supported by a number of constraints that restrict the 
Chinese and other countries from acting out in such a manner that the realists propose.  
Realists believe that the rising power of China and the shift away from the US hegemon 
and Western institutions is cause for concern.  However, the Chinese rely on the US and 
international institutions just as much as the US relies on China.  Relations between the 
US and China have improved substantially over the last several decades.  However, 
Quinlan believes “the bilateral relationship will never reach its full potential as long as 
policymakers continue to interpret America’s large trade deficit with China as a loss of 
global competitiveness or a result of unfair trade practices.  The greatest danger on the 
U.S.-China trade front is that while many in Washington view China as a ‘strategic 
competitor,’ American businesses have increasingly embraced the mainland as a 
‘strategic partner’ (Quinlan, 2002: 126).”  Just as much as the Chinese need the WTO and 
other organizations for trade purposes, American businesses rely on the manufacturing 
capabilities that China offers.  Additionally, China would face severe consequences if it 
made enemies out of the US and other countries.  China relies on other countries for the 
majority of their new technology (the source of their success in the manufacturing 
sector).  If China lost access to this technology, it risks losing the ongoing high level of 
growth that has been experienced over the last several decades.  Instead of interpreting 
China’s monopolistic actions regarding REEs as a struggle for power, it should be seen 
rather as a type of self-defense and security for self-preservation.  Their international 
power and influence, while significantly greater than in the past, has not been secured nor 
established for the long run.  The control China possesses over the REE industry 
represents a method of acquiring international significance and influence that could 
facilitate China’s smooth transition into developed country status.   
 
Liberals have a different understanding and expectation of our relationship with China.  
They realize that China does not act in a vacuum; some of the burden and responsibility 
lays on the US, other countries, and a multitude of international institutions as well.  If 
the rest of the world is unwilling to open negotiations with and allow China to participate 
in our global system, than China will rebel against it.  We have accomplished much, thus 
far, in incorporating China into the system, as both China and the rest of the world have 
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seen growth and the potential development that could come from international agreement 
and cooperation.   
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Constraints 
 
The economic liberal/liberal institutionalist perspective best describes China’s actions 
surrounding the rare earth debate.  Further evidence for the perspective that China is not 
trying to upset the current international system of norms is provided by the fact that 
China is faced with a series of political and economic constraints.  These constraints 
prevent China from acting without consideration of the repercussions and responses by 
the rest of the world.  These constraints act as a buffer, providing a sense of protection for 
the US and the rest of the world from China’s potential monopolistic desires. These also 
in turn help China ensure that its ability to reap maximum benefits of its investments.   
 
With globalization, it is very difficult for countries to compete in the international market 
without the protections, economic opportunities, collaborations, and influences that are 
inherent with belonging to the global system.  China is no different.  China needs global 
growth and access to global markets to enable its progression towards such a goal.  Only 
through cooperation, negotiation, and less mercantilist ideals can China expect to attract 
foreign companies and countries.  China desires to attract more foreign direct investment 
(FDI), either in the form of capital investments or even new technology.  The Chinese 
leadership cannot expect to entice foreign firms if suspicion of unfair trade practices that 
could potentially hurt these interested businesses is prevalent.  For this reason, it is 
imperative that China maintains a trustworthy and decent reputation in the global realm.  
This cannot be accomplished if China shows signs of desiring to overthrow our 
established international institutional system.   
 
From the political perspective, China would face severe repercussions if the leadership 
decided to employ “unfair” trade practices.  As noted above, the US, EU and Japan have 
already filed a complaint through the WTO.  To take it one step further, the US and Japan 
could collaboratively pressure China by applying sanctions or other forms of coercion to 
force them to reopen borders.  China’s main interests involve rapid economic growth.  
China’s dependence on other countries for many of its economic needs leads one to 
conclude that the last thing China would do is provoke unwanted volatility in the global 
economy, which could damage global welfare (Karapinar, 2011: 405).  However, in 
addition to provoking other countries, China should be concerned with upsetting the 
balance of the rare earth market itself.  One such example of how China could affect the 
market is through price volatility.  As we have seen, the price of several rare earths has 
increased by over 1000%.  If China were to cause price inflation, the net importing 
countries would feel the brunt of the effects.  Not only would this “undermine the 
confidence in the multilateral trading system,” but also China’s dependence on “export-
oriented growth” relies on “maintaining the stability and the predictability of the 
multilateral trading system [in] the interest of China’s long-term prosperity (Karapinar, 
2011: 405).”  Obviously, these scenarios would only be used as final solutions, as they 
could generate drastic and severe responses from both sides.  We have already seen 
extreme price volatility in the REE market, which only led to a decrease in profits for 
China.  For these reasons, the WTO was sought out by the US, the EU and Japan and 
became involved as soon as possible.   
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Economic constraints also ensure that China plays by the rules.  Already, Japan has 
developed processes to recycle many of their electronics to conserve their rare earth 
supplies.  Since 2010, when prices of rare earth metals began to skyrocket, it suddenly 
became economically viable for companies to begin mining for these resources.  This 
merely makes it more difficult for China, considering it forced this competition on 
itselves.  Economic liberals such as Dudley Kingsnorth and James Hendrick do not put 
much weight into China’s actions.  Their belief is that the rare earth markets are governed 
not so much from the supply and demand (the supply side consisting of only China until 
recently), but rather are being driven by scarcity and prices.  Because China merely 
represents a single producer in the market, they believe that given the increase in prices, 
the market will correct itself as alternatives become profitable.  These reactions to 
China’s new policies show that the realist fears, that China is attempting to control and 
dictate the movements of REEs, are unfounded.  China has no more control over the 
market than the demand side has over the prices.   
 
The Chinese face other constraints, one of which is a lack of military dominance.  The 
Chinese are not in a position to dictate law through the use of military force, mainly due 
to their global inferiority.  The US and its allies have formed coalitions that together 
could trump any sort of military force China could muster together.  Although the 
Chinese have begun to bolster their defense spending, increasing their budget by as much 
as 11% by 2012, the Chinese do not have anywhere near the capabilities that the US 
possesses (Buckley, 2012).  If the Chinese were planning on overthrowing the US 
hegemony, it will be a long time before it could achieve this through sheer military 
power.   
 
Other economic constraints that China faces are the economic repercussions and 
unintended consequences of their export restrictions.  While China may believe that its 
current export quotas on rare earth exports is opportune and in their best interest, 
evidence shows the opposite to be true.  Not only have “export restrictions [resulted] in 
net welfare losses for both the country imposing the export restriction and for the rest of 
the world by driving a wedge between the domestic and border prices,” but additionally, 
these export restrictions “undermine traders’ confidence in the world trading system – as 
they distort trade and create or aggravate short-term price volatilities (Karapinar, 2011: 
391).”  If the Chinese should decide to continue altering the natural flow of the market by 
imposing export quotas, then not only will the rest of the world feel the repercussions, but 
so will China itself.  Evidence has shown that these types of policies have not worked in 
the best interest of everyone involved, and the case of rare earth metals will be no 
different.   
 
The Chinese want to continue reaping the benefits that our current international system of 
institutions offers.  China is experiencing a high growth rate and technological 
advancement, and is now attracting huge amounts of FDI into the country.  To achieve 
sustainability, China understands that it must play by the rules enforced by these 
institutions.  In 2010, the Chinese thought that it could get away with creating an 
international monopoly on rare earths, but soon realized that the disadvantages 
outweighed the benefits and began to pull back.  Export quotas have not been as low as 
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previously expected, nor has China been quite as stringent on its policies as anticipated.  
This informs us that China is aware of these constraints and has acknowledged the fact 
that the Chinese leadership must work within the global system of norms in order to 
achieve long lasting economic (and cultural) growth and development.   
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Conclusions 
 
The economic liberal perspective has a much clearer understanding of China’s actions 
compared with the realist.  The liberal recognizes that China is already ingrained into the 
international system of institutions, reaping benefits from its involvement, cooperation 
and adherence.  China’s transition into the developed world will only evolve from 
complete acceptance and cooperation within this system.  Not only does the global 
community provide protection, it provides new trade networks and modes of acquiring 
new technology.  China has no clear reason to rebel against this system, and it potentially 
will gain immensely by working under the international umbrella.  Additionally, the 
Chinese are aware that a number of constraints exist that will inhibit them from acting 
independently in an adverse manner.  From economic to political considerations, China is 
in no position to overthrow the US hegemony or the affiliated international institutions.   
 
Examination of China’s environmental and economic situation, coupled with the public 
statements justifying these policies supports the concept of the benevolence of China’s 
actions.  While we may see the ramifications of China’s policies only in regards to how 
they affect our own economies, we must interpret China’s actions from its own 
standpoint.  The heavy environmental damage that China has sustained over the last 
several decades will take many years to reverse.  A new policy was certainly needed to 
help remedy the situation.  The US is also in the midst of trying to reduce its own 
negative environmental impact.  Additionally, China is concerned with attracting more 
FDI and high value manufacturing to within its borders.  This could not be accomplished 
without the support and protections offered by international institutions and advanced 
countries. With these environmental concerns in mind, once China realized their new 
policies were having unintended consequences (in the form of WTO reports, strong 
opposition from the US, the EU and Japan, and rising commodity prices), its leadership 
backpedaled and increased export quotas to better accommodate the commodity markets.   
 
China is caught in the awkward position of trying to be responsible for the dilemmas of a 
developing country, while being expected to follow the rules and regulations of a 
developed country as it strives to achieve that status.  With its higher level of 
development and different starting point, China cannot be expected or required to adhere 
to the same policies as the US or the EU.  It seems unfair to hold China to these same 
rules as the “developed” and “powerful” countries, who were permitted some degree of 
flexibility because these regulations were nonexistent at the time these countries went 
through similar phases of economic development.  The ‘international norms’ were 
established by the developed countries only after achieving status as world leaders, and 
appear in part to be protecting self-interests.  For this reason, China’s actions can be 
interpreted as reactionary to this system that favors the developed over the lesser 
developed.  This explains why China will not challenge the US hegemony or the 
international system of institutions.  Instead, China hopes to make the system more fair 
and balanced for countries that are attempting to evolve from “developing” to 
“developed” status.  This could be accomplished by working with, adhering to and 
cooperating with the current system of international institutions. If China is unsatisfied 
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with current policies, it should have the ability to work within the rules of the systems to 
help develop new policies to improve the world economy and global relations.   
 
Rare earths will play an increasing role in advancing the technology sector.  China’s 
current dominance and virtual monopoly in the rare earth market has forced other 
countries to seek alternative sources of these elements.  China’s future global relations 
therefore depend on whether China can work together with the international community 
or it continues to act in a monopolistic manner.  By restricting export of these valuable 
resources, China has triggered international debates on its ability and desire to work as a 
partner.   
 
In an effort to maintain domestic integrity and strength, China is unlikely to decide to 
rescind from its REE policies of tariffs and export restrictions.  However, China is 
interested in adhering to the international norms set forth by our institutions.  The 
Chinese leadership realizes that if they wish to control their own production of rare earth 
minerals to establish a strong and innovative technological sector, they must allow the 
world to work in the free market to develop alternatives to the Chinese sources.  By 
maintaining the current stance and not opening its borders, and by not beginning to 
heavily subsidize their markets to promote monopolization of the global market, China 
ensures that the rest of the world feels secure in their access to these precious resources. 
This allows both a balance in the REE market and shows that China is committed to 
working in cooperation with our system of international institutions.   
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